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ABSTRACT
Background.  Public health measures at sea ports have posed a challenge for public health
competent authorities, especially in the context of the influenza pandemic of 2009. This paper
discusses the response of authorities to notifications of infectious diseases on passenger ships
and the importance of assessing the risks related to cases of influenza. It further provides op-
tions for health measures and considerations for decision making during a pandemic such as
the influenza pandemic of 2009.
Discussion. Prevention and control of influenza have included action taken by both competent
port authorities and ships’ crews. Assessing the public health risk of each event reported from
ships to competent authorities at ports is important before advice is given on implementation of
control measures. Public health risk assessment involves appraisal of threats to passengers and
crew on board the ship as well as to the population in the community.
Summary.  Any public health measures taken should be necessary and proportional to the threat.
Measures at ports cannot alone be effective in the prevention of the spread of a disease to the
community since other means of transport play a major role. Measures taken on board ships can
be effective in containing the disease. Consistent policy based on common protocols and carried
out by competent authorities at local, national, European, or international levels are essential.
(Int Marit Health 2010; 61; 4: 241–245)
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INTRODUCTION
The implementation of public health measures at
sea ports has posed a challenge for public health
authorities in Europe, especially during the influen-
za pandemic of 2009. During 2008, the cruise in-
dustry carried an estimated 13.05 million passen-
gers on cruises around the world [1]. In 2007, there
were about 410 million cruise and ferry passenger
visits to European Union ports [2]. Before arriving at
ports, ships on international voyages are required to
declare infectious diseases on board, according to
the International Health Regulations of 2005 [3]. This
paper discusses the response of competent authori-
ties to such notifications and the importance of as-
sessing the risks related to cases of influenza aboard
passenger ships. Furthermore, it presents options for
health measures and considerations for decision-
-making during pandemics such as the influenza
pandemic of 2009. There is good guidance available
to ships’ companies, medical officers and masters
[4–7]. However, little has been published that exa-
mines the role of competent authorities at ports that
are responsible for the implementation and applica-
tion of public health measures on ships.
DISCUSSION
RISKS RELATED TO CASES OF INFLUENZA
It is important to assess the actual public health
risk posed by cases of an infectious disease on board
passenger ships. Any decision on public health in-
terventions by competent authorities should be ap-
propriate to the risks posed by the infectious agent
and the event. Risk assessment procedures should
be based on scientific evidence related to the ha-
zard, the impact of the hazard, and the likelihood of
occurrence. Important factors that can be used for
risk assessment include the characteristics of the
infectious agent such as pathogenicity and virulence
(hospitalization rate, case fatality rate, etc.), modes
of transmission, immunity of the travelling popula-
tion, and risk groups. Incidence of the disease and
geographical distribution, based on information pro-
vided by local, national, European, or international
organizations and agencies such as ECDC and WHO,
can be also taken into consideration in the risk as-
sessment process. Continuous monitoring of the pan-
demic is important in order to identify changes in
disease severity and to implement appropriate health
measures. The WHO, CDC, and the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control regularly provi-
ded pandemic risk assessments for Europe [8].
RISKS FOR PASSENGERS AND CREW ON BOARD
In the event of an influenza-like illness on board
a passenger ship, the main threat is related to the
passengers and crew who are at higher risk of deve-
loping complications from influenza and in whom the
disease might be life threatening.
Outbreaks of seasonal influenza have occurred
aboard passenger ships in recent years [9–11] with
attack rates of up to 37% [12]. If a large number of
crewmembers fall ill and are unable to perform their
duties, the safety of sailing might be affected. In ad-
dition, ill passengers will have their holidays spoilt.
Risks related to ferries may differ from those of cruise
ships. Medical consultation with a physician on fer-
ries may not be possible. Ferry voyages are shorter
and may include frequent stops to ports where me-
dical consultation ashore can be arranged. Further-
more, they do not usually involve activities, such as
games and excursions, thus giving less opportunity
for interaction among travellers.
Passenger ships can provide a setting for the
spread of disease from person to person or indirect
transmission (e.g. contaminated surfaces). During
a cruise or ferry voyage, passengers and crewmem-
bers spend much of their time indoors. Passengers
and crew may be from several nations and can in-
termingle for extended periods of time in semi-en-
closed areas. Shipboard activities and events such
as dining, games, and movies increase the likelihood
of contact between passengers, and sometimes with
crew as well. The virus is easily spread from person
to person by inhalation of the air that contains drop-
lets from infected people who cough or sneeze, or
by transferring the virus directly by hand or from
surfaces contaminated by droplets [6]. Vaccine sta-
tus may be different among passengers compared
with crew. Vaccine practices may be different in cruise
lines and ferry companies.
RISKS AT PORTS FOR THE COMMUNITY
Transnational transmission of a disease is a per-
ceived risk, but nowadays other means of transport
such as aeroplanes play a major role in the rapid
international spread of diseases. The propagation of
infectious agents to non-affected countries through
ships took place in past centuries. After the disco-
very of the New World in 1492, Old World diseases
such as smallpox, measles, influenza, and typhus
annihilated most of the American native populations
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[13]. When Christopher Columbus and his men em-
barked on the second Colombian expedition in 1493,
the crew suffered from fever, respiratory symptoms,
and malaise. It is generally accepted that the disease
was influenza [14].
PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES
The competent authorities’ task is to perform
a risk assessment in case of a threat of infectious
disease, to advise, implement, or supervise the re-
sponse measures to be taken, and to ensure that all
appropriate measures are in place to protect public
health on board and to minimise the spread of
a communicable disease from the ship to the com-
munity. Health measures implemented by competent
authorities, or under their supervision, must be in
accordance with national and international law and
appropriate to the risk that the disease poses, with-
out causing unnecessary interference to international
movement of peoples and goods. Consequently, public
health measures should not disrupt the ship’s itiner-
ary, disembarkation, or travellers’ ability to enjoy the
voyage and destination, unless such actions are jus-
tified and the rationale behind them is provided.
According to Article 28 of the IHR 2005, compe-
tent authorities “may subject the granting of free
pratique1  to inspection” [3]. Consequently, in re-
sponse to an event of infectious disease, personnel
of competent authorities have the right to board the
ship to conduct an inspection and determine whether
public health measures are required. After applica-
tion of the required health measures, permission to
disembark, embark, or load stores can be given.
MEASURES ON SHIPS
In general, competent authorities, in responding to
cases of influenza-like illness, should ensure, after con-
ducting an inspection, that all necessary measures have
been taken on board by the designated crew to con-
tain the disease. Detailed guidance for such measures,
including surveillance, isolation of ill persons, hygiene
measures such as hand washing, cough/sneeze eti-
quette and hygienic waste disposal, training, advising,
cleaning, and disinfection, has been previously pub-
lished [4–7]. Moreover, competent authorities may be
asked to receive clinical specimens from ships and send
them to the laboratory for analysis.
MEASURES AT PORTS
Authorities at ports may supervise or make ar-
rangements for the disembarkation of ill persons in
such a manner as to minimise the spread of the vi-
rus from person to person. They may arrange trans-
port of persons with severe illness to a health care
facility and notify cases to the national authorities.
According to International Health Regulations
(Annex I), competent authorities at ports are respon-
sible for providing, if necessary, medical examination
and care for affected travellers. In addition, appro-
priate space, separated from other travellers, must
be designated to interview suspected or affected
persons. Competent authorities may also assess and,
if required, quarantine suspected cases amongst tra-
vellers. Trained personnel with appropriate personal
protection, for the transfer of travellers who may car-
ry infection or contamination, should be available.
It should be noted that these capacities should be
available in all countries by 2012, according to the
IHR timeframe for implementation [3].
In an outbreak situation many persons might be
affected, and the competent authorities at ports
should have the capacity to deal with a large num-
ber of ill people who might need treatment, medical
assessment, or hospitalization after disembarking.
Response plans should be in place involving all local
competent parties with defined roles and responsi-
bilities, as required in Annex I of the International
Health Regulations. If the competent authority is not
able to carry out the required control measures then
the next known port should be informed [3].
Other measures may also be taken according to
the findings of the risk assessment performed.
A change in the disease severity may require addi-
tional or more rigorous measures.
EXPERIENCE DURING THE INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC OF 2009
During the initial phase of the pandemic, mea-
sures to prevent the introduction of the disease in
a country were considered by some countries to
delay the spread of the disease. We believe that
such measures are of little value since other means
of transport play the key role in the transnational
transmission of diseases. The effectiveness of mea-
sures taken to prevent the transnational transmis-
sion of pandemic influenza, such as entry scree-
ning using thermal cameras [15], is controversial
[16]. Historical data from the 1918 and 1957 pan-
demics show that screening and quarantining trav-
ellers at international borders did not substantially
delay virus introduction, except in some island coun-
tries, and are likely to be even less effective in the
modern era [17]. Control measures against influen-
za pandemic spread are most effectively implement-
ed within countries, particularly at the community
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level, rather than through banning travel at the in-
ternational level [6].
Within the first months of the influenza pande-
mic of 2009, proposed public health measures in
the community focused on containment of the dis-
ease and differed from the mitigation measures that
were later proposed and implemented. Although
a mitigation policy can be recommended in the com-
munity, on board ships the containment of disease
is advocated in many studies and guidelines, even
for seasonal influenza [4, 10, 18].
During the summer of 2009, incidents of influen-
za A(H1N1)v virus on board cruise ships gained
media attention, with some receiving wide coverage.
Various approaches and practices were observed
among European countries, some of which differed
even within the same country. Some authorities re-
quired temperature checks on all passengers going
ashore, while others did not accept isolation in ca-
bins, but required disembarkation of ill passengers
and crew and admission to hospital. In countries
outside Europe, public health measures included
treatment and isolation of travellers (crew members
and passengers), swab testing of travellers, home
quarantine of persons who disembarked, quarantine
of suspected cases, medical assessment, and scree-
ning [19]. Quarantine of a ship was even discussed
and recommended. We believe that there is no justi-
fication for implementing quarantine measures for
ships under the current epidemiological situation,
taking into consideration the characteristics of the
virus (pathogenicity, virulence, etc.).
CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION-MAKING
Respiratory illnesses (common cold and influen-
za) are some of the most common infections affec-
ting people [20]. Studies on cruise ships [21] and
cargo ships [22] have shown that respiratory tract
infections were the most frequently diagnosed illnes-
ses for passengers and crew attending the ship’s in-
firmary. Cases of influenza A(H1N1)v virus infection
aboard passenger ships have occurred on ships [19].
Because cases of seasonal influenza often occur on
ships and there is widespread transmission of the
influenza A(H1N1)v virus in the community, it is like-
ly that passenger ships carrying thousands of people
would have at least one person with this influenza
[6]. We believe that a risk assessment on board the
ship may not be necessary on every ship that has
reported cases of influenza-like illness and often it is
not feasible. Many European ports receive a huge
number of ship visits every year. Popular ports might
receive up to twenty ship visits each day during the
summer months. Personnel available in competent
authorities might have additional responsibilities to
those relating to ships. Some authorities might face
problems with lack of personnel or other resources.
Assessing the risk of each reported event is neces-
sary, however, before proceeding with the enforce-
ment of public health measures. Criteria that could
be considered as relevant by competent authorities
when conducting risk assessment on board ships
having cases of influenza include: a) severe disease
or death on board; b) failure of the ship to fill in an
appropriate Maritime Declaration of Health; c) the
number of cases presenting with influenza-like illness
exceeds that expected (outbreak situation) for the
specific itinerary and season; d) any indication or
information (e.g. information from the previous port
of call) that the ship has not implemented appropri-
ate measures (surveillance, isolation, communication,
treatment, etc.); e) the need to follow up outbreak
control measures advised at an earlier stage; f) a re-
quest for assistance by the ship’s master.
SUMMARY
A lack of communication between ports might
result in a repetition of risk assessments and con-
flicting advice, or a failure to follow up the outcome
of health measures recommended previously by other
competent authorities. Port-to-port communication is
necessary in order to share information about the
health measures that have been taken, as provided
in the IHR [3]. Ships travel from country to country,
and a lack of common protocols may lead to contra-
dictory measures and the duplication of investiga-
tions.
Consistent policy, harmonization, and standardi-
sation of competent authorities’ actions based on
common protocols at a local, national, European, and
international level are important. Using communica-
tion tools such as the European Commission Early
Warning and Response System or other effective
communication systems among competent authori-
ties, in order to perform a proper risk assessment
and to follow up the effect of the health measures,
can contribute to effectively controlling disease out-
breaks. In this way duplication of investigations and
unnecessary interventions will be avoided.
Risk assessment based on the current facts about
diseases is necessary so that the public health mea-
sures implemented at ports are proportional to the
threat, and overreactions are avoided.
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